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INTRODUCTION 
In corporate transactions, “sandbagging” refers to a situation 
where a buyer knows that a seller’s representation in a purchase 
agreement is false, but nevertheless closes the transaction and later 
seeks to hold the seller liable for that breach. In recent years, 
Delaware has held the reputation of being a “pro-sandbagging” 
state due to its commitment to freedom-of-contract principles and 
certain Chancery Court opinions. However, on May 24, 2018,  
the Delaware Supreme Court cast that reputation into doubt.  
In Eagle Force Holdings, LLC v. Campbell, the court mentioned 
sandbagging in a footnote stating that “we have not yet resolved” 
 
 *  J. Reuben Clark Law School, J.D. Candidate 2021; Texas Tech University,  
B.A. 2018. This Article would not have been possible without the statistical expertise and 
generous mentorship of Professor Matthew Jennejohn. Any error is my own. 
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whether a buyer who knows of a breach of a representation or 
warranty can recover against a seller.1 
With just a footnote, the Delaware Supreme Court sent ripples 
of uncertainty into the market as practitioners and academics 
wondered if the state’s highest court was considering a shift away 
from a pro-sandbagging default rule. My empirical study asked 
how the mergers and acquisitions market dealt—and continues to 
deal—with that uncertainty. The data ultimately showed: (1) the 
market as a whole generally did not include a sandbagging 
provision, leaving the parties subject to the state’s default rules; 
(2) although some law firms took a similar sandbagging approach 
in all deals, a majority of repeat mergers and acquisition players did 
not; and (3) when a pro-sandbagging provision was used, there was 
an increase in the similarity of the provision’s language in 
Delaware agreements after the Eagle Force holding. 
This data likely suggests that the market trusts that Delaware 
will continue a pro-sandbagging default regime—or at least that 
increased seller negotiating leverage in a hot acquisition market 
outweighs any need to negotiate for an explicit pro-sandbagging 
provision. Furthermore, the use of similar pro-sandbagging 
provisions may suggest a trend whereby new contractual language 
drafted or altered in response to Eagle Force is becoming “locked in” 
to the market, standardizing across law firms. Further research 
should trace the development of sandbagging provisions over time 
to see if these patterns continue, as well as keep abreast on 
subsequent Delaware cases that provide clues as to the corporate 
state’s stance on sandbagging and any related market reaction. 
In Part I, this Article examines: (i) the doctrine of sandbagging 
generally, (ii) what the Delaware Supreme Court said in Eagle Force, 
(iii) how the sandbagging question might be resolved in the future 
based on comments the court made in the Eagle Force footnote,  
and (iv) a Court of Chancery case that briefly addressed the issue  
post-Eagle Force. Part II adds to the literature with empirical 
research regarding sandbagging in Delaware and New York 
transactions after Eagle Force; while articles, law firm websites, and 
practitioners’ comments encouraged pro-sandbagging provisions 
in light of Eagle Force’s disruption, there was no increase in the 
provisions in the months following the case. Purchase agreements 
 
 1. Eagle Force Holdings, LLC v. Campbell, 187 A.3d 1209, 1236 n.185 (Del. 2018). 
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of all types were largely and increasingly silent on sandbagging, 
leaving the parties subject to Delaware’s default rule. Finally, 
Part III hypothesizes on what the data communicates about the 
market’s lack of reaction to Eagle Force, arguing that parties 
ultimately still believe Delaware’s pro-sandbagging reputation will 
hold true, or that at least any uncertainty created by Eagle Force  
is outweighed by increased seller leverage in the market and  
the desire to avoid increased transaction costs negotiating for 
explicit protection. 
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF “SANDBAGGING” JURISPRUDENCE 
A. What is “Sandbagging”? 
In mergers and acquisitions, “sandbagging” refers to a situation 
where the buyer knows that the seller’s representation in a 
purchase agreement is false, but nevertheless closes the transaction 
and later seeks to hold the seller liable for breach of that 
representation.2 The word carries a negative connotation;  
Merriam-Webster defines it as meaning “to treat unfairly or 
harshly” or “to conceal or misrepresent one’s true position, 
potential, or intent especially in order to gain an advantage.”3 But 
sandbaggers are not always as surreptitious as the term may imply. 
 
 2. Mark Edgarton & Kevin C. Quigley, Sandbagging: Choice of Law Matters, CHOATE: 
INSIGHTS (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.choate.com/insights/sandbagging-choice-of-law-
matters.html; see also Jacek Jastrzębski, “Sandbagging” and the Distinction Between Warranty 
Clauses and Contractual Indemnities, 19 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 207, 208–09 (2019); Brandon Cole, 
Knowledge Is Not Necessarily Power: Sandbagging in New York M&A Transactions, 42 J. CORP. L. 
445, 446 (2016); Sara Garcia Duran & Sacha Jamal, Possible Shift in Delaware Law: Buyer’s 
Silence on Sandbagging Is Not Golden, BUS. L. TODAY: MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS (Sept. 28, 2018), 
https://businesslawtoday.org/2018/09/possible-shift-delaware-law-buyers-silence-
sandbagging-not-golden/. 
 3. Sandbag, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
sandbag (last visited Sept. 30, 2020); see also Stacey A. Shadden, How to Sandbag Your Opponent 
in the Unsuspecting World of High Stakes Acquisitions, 47 CREIGHTON L. REV. 459, 459 (2014); 
Seth Cleary, Delaware Law, Friend or Foe? The Debate Surrounding Sandbagging and How 
Delaware’s Highest Court Should Rule on a Default Rule, 72 SMU L. REV. 821, 825 (2019) (“The 
term ‘sandbagger’ is commonly used in golf to denote a player who pretends, usually 
through an inflated handicap, to be worse than they are to take advantage of the 
opposition.”); Duran & Jamal, supra note 2, at n.1 (“The term ‘sandbagging’ dates back to the 
19th century when street gangs would craft a homemade weapon by pouring sand into 
socks. Although the sock looked innocuous enough, when swung at an enemy, the concealed 
lump of sand could inflict substantial damage. The term has evolved to represent concealing 
or misrepresenting with the purpose of deceiving another.”). 
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Buyers could bring concerns about the validity of certain 
representations to the seller before closing only to have the seller 
dismiss those concerns, refuse to adjust the purchase price, and 
demand that the sale go through.4 Sandbagging thus serves as a 
remedy for buyers, who may feel pressured to close, to confirm the 
accuracy of the seller’s representations or be compensated 
otherwise. The seller represented as to certain facts in the 
agreement, and sandbagging buyers contracted for the right to hold 
them accountable to those representations.5 
Traditionally, a buyer must have relied on the seller’s warranty 
in order to bring a claim, “reflecting the action’s historical 
grounding in tort.”6 Sandbagging law has evolved from tort to 
contract law, and “modern theory”7 courts like Delaware and New 
York generally consider the representations and warranties as 
bargained-for provisions and refuse to change the parties’ 
 
 4. See, e.g., CBS Inc. v. Ziff-Davis Publ’g Co., 553 N.E.2d 997, 998 (N.Y. 1990). 
 5. Jastrzębski, supra note 2, at 223 (“[U]nder modern contract law, express warranties 
are of purely contractual nature and should be construed and enforced in exactly the same 
method as other terms of the agreement.”); see Charles K. Whitehead, Sandbagging: Default 
Rules and Acquisition Agreements, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1081, 1085 (2011) (“Chief among Buyer’s 
arguments . . . is the claim that Buyer ‘purchased the warranties’ from Seller, and therefore, 
the cost of a sandbagging right was reflected in the price it paid.”); Aleksandra Miziolek & 
Dimitrios Angelakos, Sandbagging: From Poker to the World of Mergers and Acquisitions, 92 
MICH. BAR J. 30, 31 (2013) (arguing that the responsibility for accurate disclosure depends on 
the seller, the buyer’s ability to rely on accurate warranties is part of the bargain struck 
between the parties, and that an inquiry into the buyer’s knowledge would complicate the 
indemnification process and stymie a buyer’s recovery with mere allegations). But see 
Whitehead, supra, at 1103 (“Deliberate sandbagging is ethically questionable to many, and 
anti-sandbagging is the norm in Europe.”); Miziolek & Angelakos, supra (“[S]ellers contend 
that it is fundamentally unfair to be subjected to full due diligence review by a buyer’s 
sophisticated advisors only to have the buyer withhold discovered information, acquire the 
business, and seek to recover damages on a breach of warranty claim.”). See Professor 
Whitehead’s article generally for efficiency-based, risk-based, and empirically based 
arguments in support of a default anti-sandbagging rule. Sandbagging provisions may be 
more appropriate in some cases than others. See Ana Sofia Batista, Carl-Olof E. Bouveng, 
Wayne D. Gray, Abhijit Joshi, Gregory E. Ostling & Ronaldo C. Veirano, Private Mergers and 
Acquisitions—Global Trends in Buyer Protection, 26 INT’L L. PRACTICUM 59, 62 (2013). 
 6. Whitehead, supra note 5, at 1084; see also Jastrzębski, supra note 2, at 219–20. 
 7. See Jastrzębski, supra note 2, at 209, 215 (“[T]he trend is that U.S. state law is 
gradually moving from anti-sandbagging positions to pro-sandbagging positions,” with the 
two most prominent corporate jurisdictions, Delaware and New York, adopting a  
pro-sandbagging default rule.). 
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deliberate allocation of risk.8 Although “characterizing a state as 
pro-sandbagging or anti-sandbagging may not provide a complete 
description of the relevant case law,”9 Delaware—known for its 
commitment to freedom-of-contract principles—has long held the 
reputation of a pro-sandbagging state.10 This belief was largely 
based on Delaware Chancery Court opinions, as the Delaware 
Supreme Court has not definitively ruled on the issue.11 
 In 2015, Vice Chancellor Laster explicitly said in NASDI 
Holdings v. North American Leasing that “Delaware is what is 
affectionately known as a ‘sandbagging’ state,”12 noting that the 
fact that a party completed due diligence does not contravene the 
representations and warranties’ allocation of risk.13 Vice Chancellor 
Laster is not an anomaly either. Then-Vice Chancellor Strine 
authored at least one opinion that has been commonly interpreted 
as holding that buyers are not required to show reliance in order to 
 
 8. See, e.g., Whitehead, supra note 5, at 1084 n.14 (quoting then-Chancellor Strine in 
Cobalt Operating, LLC v. James Crystal Enters., No. Civ.A. 714-VCS, 2007 WL 2142926,  
at *28 (Del. Ch. July 20, 2007)). 
 9. Id. at 1091 (emphasis added). 
 10. See, e.g., Timothy R. Donovan & Jodi A. Simala, The Definitive M&A Agreement—
Anti-sandbagging Provisions, 3 SUCCESSFUL PARTNERING BETWEEN INSIDE & OUTSIDE COUNS. 
§ 41:43 (“Until recently, the only relevant question under Delaware law seemed to be 
whether the seller breached any of its representations or warranties.”); Cole, supra note 2,  
at 448 (“Delaware does not require a buyer to prove reliance on the truth of the 
representation in order to assert a breach of warranty claim . . . .”); The Ann. Surv. Working 
Grp. of the M&A Juris. Subcomm., Mergers & Acquisitions Comm., ABA Bus. L. 
Section, Annual Survey of Judicial Developments Pertaining to Mergers and Acquisitions, 74 BUS. 
LAW. 437, 461 (2019) [hereinafter Annual Survey Working Group] (“For most practitioners, 
Delaware law for at least the last decade had seemed settled . . . .”); Duran & Jamal, supra 
note 2 (“The law regarding sandbagging . . . in Delaware seemed clear to many 
practitioners.”); Daniel E. Wolf, Sandbagging in Delaware, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE (June 20, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/06/20/sandbagging-
in-delaware/ (“The popular belief among dealmakers has been that Delaware is generally 
‘pro-sandbagging’ . . . .”); Edgarton & Quigley, supra note 2 (“For at least the past decade, 
Delaware has been widely understood by both corporate practitioners and litigators to be a 
pro-sandbagging state.”); Cleary, supra note 3, at 828 (“Delaware is considered by many as 
allowing parties great latitude when contracting and having that freedom judicially 
enforced.”). But see id. at 829 (“However, this simple approach to the issue is flawed because 
it does not consider the intermixing of tort and contract principles that afflict Delaware’s  
pro-contract jurisprudence . . . .”). 
 11. Annual Survey Working Group, supra note 10. 
 12. Duran & Jamal, supra note 2 (quoting from NASDI Holdings v. North Am. Leasing, 
No. 10540-VCL, slip op. at 57 (Del. Ch. Oct. 23, 2015)); Wolf, supra note 10 (quoting from the 
same case). 
 13. Wolf, supra note 10. 
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bring a breach of contract claim,14 which essentially amounts to a 
pro-sandbagging rule. As he stated: “A breach of contract claim is 
not dependent on a showing of justifiable reliance. . . . Having 
contractually promised [the buyer] that it could rely on certain 
representations, [the seller] is in no position to contend that [the 
buyer] was unreasonable in relying on [the seller’s] own binding 
words.”15 In fact, Vice Chancellor Laster has relied heavily on this 
very language in deciding later cases.16 
Of course, attorneys drafting these transactions could simply 
negotiate for an anti-sandbagging provision in order to prevent it 
from happening.17 However, states’ default sandbagging rules 
matter because “agreements very often remain silent on the issue,” 
despite the option to contract for explicit pro- or anti-sandbagging 
provisions.18 And parties often pick Delaware as the agreement’s 
governing law precisely for their understanding of the 
contractarian, free-market state’s default rules. As Glenn West, a 
lawyer for Weil, Gotshal & Manges, stated: “[T]he selection of 
Delaware law was viewed by many buyers as avoiding the need for 
 
 14. Duran & Jamal, supra note 2 (referencing Cobalt Operating, LLC v. James Crystal 
Enters., No. Civ.A. 714-VCS, 2007 WL 2142926, at *28 (Del. Ch. July 20, 2007)); Annual Survey 
Working Group, supra note 10 (citing Cobalt to support the claim that practitioners’ belief in 
Delaware’s pro-sandbagging stance was based on Chancery decisions). Note that Professor 
Whitehead quotes the same case supra note 5. Contra Duran & Jamal, supra note 2 (“[B]ut the 
Cobalt case might not be as strong as it first appears because the contract . . . contained a 
clause that representations would not be affected by due diligence, and the court found that 
the Cobalt defendant intentionally obscured its fraud and gave misleading explanations 
when the plaintiff inquired about inconsistencies . . . . These two facts can make it easy for a 
court to distinguish the case . . . .”). Despite Duran and Jamal’s misgivings about the strength 
of Cobalt, Vice Chancellor Laster’s reliance on it explicitly and in large part in at least two 
later cases minimizes its distinguishability. See infra note 16. 
 15. Edgarton & Quigley, supra note 2 (quoting Cobalt Operating, LLC, 2007 WL 2142926, 
at *28). 
 16. See Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG, No. 2018-0300-JTL, 2018 WL 4719347,  
at *76–77 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2018) (unpublished opinion); Universal Enter. Grp., L.P. v.  
Duncan Petrol. Corp., No. 4948-VCL, 2013 WL 3353743, at *17 (Del. Ch. July 1, 2013) 
(unpublished opinion). 
 17. Cole, supra note 2 (“Parties can directly approach this issue [of sandbagging] by 
incorporating sandbagging or anti-sandbagging provisions into the acquisition 
agreement.”); Whitehead, supra note 5, at 1085 (“The parties, however, can contract around 
both the traditional and modern default rules.”). 
 18. Jastrzęnski, supra note 2, at 209. 
5.KIMBALL_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)  3/11/2021  1:01 AM 
577 Eagle Force Holdings & the Market’s Reaction 
 577 
 
the inclusion of any specific clause addressing this issue.”19 Thus, 
Delaware’s actual and perceived pro-sandbagging stance is of 
consequence as parties—buyers in particular—rely on the state’s 
default rule in drafting their agreements. 
B. Eagle Force Holdings 
Delaware’s strong pro-sandbagging reputation was cast into 
doubt in May 2018, when the Delaware Supreme Court decided 
Eagle Force Holdings, LLC v.  Campbell.20 The issue of the case was 
whether certain contracts were binding on the parties. Sandbagging 
was of no consequence in deciding the case. However, in a footnote, 
the court stated: 
We acknowledge the debate over whether a party can recover on 
a breach of warranty claim where the parties know that, at 
signing, certain of them were not true. Campbell argues that 
reliance is required, but we have not yet resolved this interesting 
question. And we observe that a majority of states have followed the New 
York Court of Appeals’ decision in CBS Inc. v. Ziff-Davis Publishing 
Co., which holds that traditional reliance is not required to recover for 
breach of an express warranty: the only “reliance” required is that 
the express warranty is part of the bargain between the 
parties. (“This view of ‘reliance’—i.e., as requiring no more than 
reliance on the express warranty as being a part of the bargain 
between the parties—reflects the prevailing perception of an 
action for breach of express warranty as one that is no longer 
grounded in tort, but essentially in contract.”). We need not 
decide this interesting issue because such claims are not before 
the court.21 
To summarize, the court acknowledged the sandbagging 
debate, stated that the issue was not resolved in Delaware, and 
identified CBS Inc v. Ziff-Davis, a seminal New York case in favor of 
 
 19. Glenn D. West, A Delaware Supreme Court Footnote Reignites Concerns About  
the Reliability of Contractual Representations & Warranties—Are Deal Lawyers Really Going  
to Start Debating Sandbagging Again?, WEIL: GLOB. PRIV. EQUITY WATCH  
(Oct. 1, 2018), https://privateequity.weil.com/features/delaware-supreme-court-footnote/. 
But see Whitehead, supra note 5, at 1081 (“[T]he law around sandbagging  
is unsettled.”). 
 20. Eagle Force Holdings, LLC v.  Campbell, 187 A.3d 1209 (Del. 2018). 
 21. Id. at 1236 n.185 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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sandbagging, as one received favorably by a majority of states. The 
court said no more, noting that its words were dicta. 
Chief Justice Strine in his concurring-in-part/dissenting-in-part 
opinion also addressed sandbagging in passing. He appeared to 
take a less favorable stance than the majority: “[T]o the extent [the 
buyer] is seeking damages because [the seller] supposedly made 
promises that were false, there is doubt that he can then turn 
around and sue because what he knew to be false remained so. 
Venerable Delaware law casts doubt on [the buyer’s] ability to  
do so . . . .”22 Chief Justice Strine cited a case from 1913— 
Clough v. Cook23—with an explanatory parenthetical, saying “a 
party who signs a contract with knowledge that a representation is 
false may not later claim reliance on it.”24 
Although the Delaware Supreme Court’s comments were but 
briefly mentioned in a footnote and are clearly dicta (the court 
admitted “such claims are not before the court”25), the corporate 
world was nevertheless swift to react. Within a few months, 
lawyers from Sidley Austin, Kirkland & Ellis, and Weil, Gotshal & 
Manges (just to name a few) authored articles in reaction to the case, 
advising buyers to include pro-sandbagging provisions in their 
agreements to avoid being subject to disputes over “what they 
knew and when in order to enforce the seller’s express contractual 
warranties.”26 Although some attorneys have recognized that “the 
 
 22. Id. at 1247 (Strine, C.J., concurring in part/dissenting in part). It is interesting to 
note that Chief Justice Strine took a less favorable stance on sandbagging in Eagle Force, but 
he authored the Cobalt opinion that has been heavily relied on in establishing Delaware’s 
pro-sandbagging jurisprudence. See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text. 
 23. Clough v. Cook, 87 A. 1017, 1018 (Del. Ch. 1913). 
 24. Eagle Force Holdings, 187 A.3d at 1247 n.39. 
 25. Id. at 1236 n.185. 
 26. West, supra note 19 (West is a partner at Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP. People, WEIL, 
https://www.weil.com/people/glenn-west (last visited Mar. 27, 2020)); Duran & Jamal, 
supra note 2 (“[B]uyers are best advised to include a pro-sandbagging clause . . . in the 
purchase agreement. . . . Eagle Force has put buyers on notice that they might need to update 
their approach to sandbagging.”) (Duran is a partner at Sidley Austin LLP. People, SIDLEY, 
https://www.sidley.com/en/people/d/duran-sara-garcia (last visited Mar. 27, 2020)); 
Wolf, supra note 10 (“Parties may wish to take account of these comments from the Supreme 
Court in negotiating purchase agreement provisions relating to sandbagging.”) (Wolf is a 
partner at Kirkland & Ellis. Lawyers, KIRKLAND & ELLIS, https://www.kirkland.com/ 
lawyers/w/wolf-daniel-e-pc (last visited Mar. 27, 2020)); Annual Survey Working Group, 
supra note 10, at 464 (“[C]ounsel to buyers should strongly consider including a  
‘pro-sandbagging’ or ‘knowledge-saving’ clause in their acquisition agreements rather than 
being silent on the subject and leaving it up to Delaware’s default rule.”). 
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stated need to reignite the pro- versus anti-sandbagging clause 
debate may be overstated,” given Delaware’s commitment to 
“contractarianism,”27 there is no doubt that corporate attorneys are 
keeping close tabs on potential developments in Delaware 
sandbagging law. Eagle Force “is the first Delaware Supreme Court 
pronouncement on sandbagging,” and may signal a shift in 
Delaware law.28 
In predicting Delaware’s stance, it is imperative to note what 
the Delaware Supreme Court did not say. It did not cite any of “the 
extensive pro-sandbagging Chancery Court case law in 
Delaware.”29 It referenced the influential New York Court of 
Appeals case Ziff-Davis, and it suggested—but did not explicitly 
state—that it would follow it. The court also did not mention later 
New York jurisprudence—Ziff-Davis’s progeny—that narrowed 
New York’s pro-sandbagging stance by taking into account the 
source of the buyer’s knowledge and other nuances.30 However, as 
the court hinted that it would follow Ziff-Davis, that case likely 
gives the corporate world the best clue as to what the court might 
hold in the future. 
C. Ziff-Davis and New York Sandbagging Law 
In Ziff-Davis, parties to a transaction entered a binding 
agreement, and the seller represented as to the truthfulness of the 
financial statements provided to the buyer. While performing due 
diligence, the buyer came to believe that the warranted information 
was untrue. When the seller was approached with this concern, the 
seller dismissed it as meritless and “insisted that the sale go 
through as agreed.”31 The parties closed the transaction, and the 
buyer sued. The issue posed by the court was as follows: “Did the 
buyer’s manifested lack of belief in and reliance on the truth of the 
 
 27. West, supra note 19. 
 28. Donovan & Simala, supra note 10. 
 29. Edgarton & Quigley, supra note 2. See Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG,  
No. 2018-0300-JTL, 2018 WL 4719347, at *77 n.756 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2018), for a list of Delaware 
precedent on this point cited by Vice Chancellor Laster. 
 30. See Edgarton & Quigley, supra note 2 (citing Galli v. Metz, 973 F.2d 145  
(2nd Cir. 1992) (“If the buyer’s knowledge is based on facts affirmatively disclosed by the 
seller, as opposed to facts uncovered through the buyer’s own due diligence, then the buyer 
may not be able to recover for breach absent an express pro-sandbagging provision.”). 
 31. CBS Inc. v. Ziff-Davis Publ’g Co., 553 N.E.2d 997, 998 (N.Y. 1990). 
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warranted information prior to the closing relieve the seller of its 
obligations under the warranties?”32 The Ziff-Davis court said the 
answer is no. The New York Court of Appeals held “that reliance is 
not required to recover for a breach of a representation or 
warranty.”33 The only “reliance” needed is reliance on the express 
warranty as being a part of the bargain between the parties.34  
The court noted that the parties had a “mutual understanding” that 
closing would not constitute a waiver of any rights under the 
purchase agreement, and the “critical question [was] not whether 
the buyer believed in the truth of the warranted information . . . but 
‘whether [it] believed [it] was purchasing the [seller’s] promise [as 
to its truth].’”35 The express warranty was part of the contract, and 
requiring reliance would have deprived the warranties of their 
primary purpose and value—assuring the buyer that the 
representations were true. In short, the court held that “[t]he right 
to indemnification depends only on establishing that the warranty 
was breached.”36 
Largely because of Ziff-Davis, New York has generally been 
considered a pro-sandbagging state, but commentators have 
recognized the development of more nuance and ambiguity since 
the case was decided in 1990.37 Subsequent federal cases applying 
New York contract law, most notably Galli v. Metz, narrowed the 
Ziff-Davis holding.38 Galli suggests that New York courts should 
consider the source of the knowledge in determining whether 
sandbagging is appropriate.39 Buyers would be unable to 
indemnify the seller based on facts affirmatively disclosed by the 
seller (absent an express pro-sandbagging provision), while facts 
uncovered through the buyer’s due diligence process would be fair 
game for indemnification purposes.40 Additionally, when the buyer 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. Wolf, supra note 10. 
 34. Ziff-Davis, 553 N.E.2d at 1001. 
 35. Id. at 1000–01 (alteration in original). 
 36. Id. at 1001. 
 37. Cole, supra note 2, at 446, 449. 
 38. Galli v. Metz, 973 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 39. Id. at 151 (“Thus, whether [buyer’s] knowledge . . . vitiates his warranty breach 
claim depends on the circumstances in which [buyer] learned of the problem.”). 
 40. Id. (“Where a buyer closes on a contract in the full knowledge and acceptance of 
facts disclosed by the seller which would constitute a breach of warranty under the terms of 
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discovered the falsity could affect her recovery; “knowledge of the 
breach pre-signing, as opposed to only pre-closing, may prevent a 
buyer from later claiming indemnification for a breach.”41 
After Ziff-Davis and Galli, courts have “struggled to apply New 
York [sandbagging] law,” trying to balance the broad wording of 
Ziff-Davis with the potentially distinguishable facts of Ziff-Davis 
and the limiting language of Galli.42 As a result, some courts have 
confirmed New York’s purported pro-sandbagging stance 
established by Ziff-Davis, while others have distinguished cases 
based on Galli’s stated exception—the source of buyer’s 
knowledge.43 Thus, the stance of New York sandbagging law is, as 
Professor Jastrzębski called it, “more nuanced.”44 A synthesis of 
New York sandbagging law could read as follows: 
[U]nless there is an effective pro-sandbagging clause in the M&A 
agreement, a purchaser’s knowledge prior to closing of a breach 
of representation, warranty or covenant contained in a M&A 
agreement will prevent that purchaser from seeking damages or 
indemnification post-closing IF the purchaser is aware of such 
breach as a result of the vendor’s disclosure.45 
If the Delaware Supreme Court was hinting that it would follow 
New York sandbagging law, then we can expect a similar sort of 
qualified pro-sandbagging regime. It is imperative to note, 
however, that the court only cited CBS v. Ziff-Davis, stating that a 
majority of states have followed that seminal case. Since Ziff-Davis 
is unquestionably a strong pro-sandbagging case, perhaps its 
 
the contract, the buyer should be foreclosed from later asserting the breach.”); see Cole, supra 
note 2, at 450 (“[I]f a third party disclosed the breach of warranty, the buyer in Galli would 
have a strong argument under the CBS rule. This distinction was later illustrated in Rogath 
v. Siebenmann. . . . [I]f the source of buyer knowledge is common knowledge or a third party 
disclosed the information to them . . . the buyer may prevail in a breach of warranty claim.”) 
(citing Galli, 973 F.2d at 151; Rogath v. Siebenmann, 129 F.3d 261, 265 (2d Cir. 1997)). 
 41. Wolf, supra note 10. 
 42. Jastrzębski, supra note 2, at 217. 
 43. See id. nn. 43–47. 
 44. Id. at 218; Cole, supra note 2, at 446 (“The focus of this Note, the State of New York, 
has ambiguous sandbagging case law that has made it difficult to predict what the 
appropriate outcome would be for buyers and sellers of businesses.”). Cole argues in his 
article that New York’s stance is “more equitable.” Cole, supra note 2, at 457. 
 45. Cole, supra note 2, at 450 (alteration in original) (quoting Joe Brennan, 
“Sandbagging” and “Knowledge” Clauses in M&A Agreements, SHEA NERLAND L. (Nov. 2, 2012), 
http://www.snclaw.com/cgblog/48/123/Sandbagging-and-Knowledge-Clauses-in-M-A-
Agreements [https://perma.cc/Y4UP-PNZY]). 
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progeny is irrelevant, and the court is hinting at a broader pro-
sandbagging rule. This is likely where practitioners and scholars 
alike thought Delaware’s stance was all along. 
But if the Delaware Supreme Court wanted to set out a pro-
sandbagging stance, why refer to a New York case instead of 
Delaware Chancery caselaw? There might be a number of reasons: 
First, although there is Chancery case law in support of 
sandbagging as a default rule, Ziff-Davis is unquestionably the 
leading case on the topic. Perhaps the court was simply pointing to 
the case that most famously represented the principle, regardless of 
the jurisdiction. Second, as has been noted, the state’s supreme 
court has not yet taken a stance on it. Citing a seminal New York 
opinion that has been followed by a majority of states could signal 
the court’s thoughts on taking an official stance on the subject 
instead of simply falling in line with the less weighty Chancery 
opinions. Third, although dealmakers seem to believe the case law 
in Delaware points one direction, Chief Justice Strine seems to  
think that “venerable Delaware law” points the other direction.  
The majority opinion in Eagle Force could be showing Chief Justice 
Strine another way for him to justify a pro-sandbagging stance 
through persuasive authority. 
D. A Delaware Chancery Opinion Post-Eagle Force 
As of this writing, the Delaware Supreme Court has still not 
definitively ruled on sandbagging. However, the issue came up in 
the Court of Chancery in the famous material adverse effect (MAE) 
case, Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG,46 which was decided a few 
months after Eagle Force in October 2018. Vice Chancellor Laster, 
cited previously in this Article for his elucidation on Delaware’s 
pro-sandbagging stance years before,47 confidently stated that: 
I agree that Fresenius knew broadly about the risk of regulatory 
non-compliance; that is precisely why Fresenius bargained for 
representations on this subject. I do not agree, however, that 
Fresenius’s general knowledge about potential regulatory issues 
or questions about the extent to which it conducted due diligence 
 
 46. Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG, No. 2018-0300-JTL, 2018 WL 4719347  
(Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2018). 
 47. See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text. 
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into these issues means that Fresenius cannot now rely on the 
representation it obtained.48 
He then referred to the aforementioned Cobalt case,49 citing 
Chief Justice Strine’s statement that “[A] breach of contract claim is 
not dependent on a showing of justifiable reliance” because 
representations and warranties are essentially an important “risk 
allocation function.”50 Other Delaware cases were cited for the 
same principle.51 
Vice Chancellor Laster thus reiterated that reliance is not 
needed to breach a representation or warranty, which is essentially 
what Ziff-Davis stands for.52 Furthermore, the citation of Cobalt and 
a lengthy string cite of other Delaware cases rebuts the point made 
in the Eagle Force footnote that there is a debate on this issue,53 and 
it especially refutes Chief Justice Strine’s opinion that “[v]enerable 
Delaware law casts doubt on [the buyer’s] ability” to sue when the 
buyer is aware that information represented to was false.54 
Admittedly, Vice Chancellor Laster refers only to Chancery cases, 
Delaware Superior Court cases, and secondary sources,55 so the 
question is still undecided by the Delaware Supreme Court. Or, as 
the Eagle Force majority stated, “we have not yet resolved this 
interesting question.”56 
That being said, Vice Chancellor Laster was clearly undeterred 
by any doubt created by the Delaware Supreme Court in Eagle Force 
based on his strong language in Akorn v. Fresenius. Adopting Vice 
Chancellor Laster’s view of sandbagging as expressed here would 
be akin to following the general principle from Ziff-Davis. Akorn, 
coupled with the dicta reference to Ziff-Davis in Eagle Force, lead to 
an inference that sandbagging might not be in danger after all. 
 
 48. Akorn, Inc., 2018 WL 4719347, at *76. 
 49. See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text. 
 50. Akorn, Inc., 2018 WL 4719347, at *76 (alteration in original). 
 51. Id. at *77 n. 756. 
 52. See supra Section I.C. 
 53. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 54. Eagle Force Holdings, LLC v. Campbell, 187 A.3d 1209, 1247 (Del. 2018). 
 55. Akorn, Inc., 2018 WL 4719347, at *77 n.756. 
 56. Eagle Force Holdings, 187 A.3d at 1236 n.185. 
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Today, despite the uncertainty caused by the Eagle Force 
footnote,57 many attorneys still feel confident that Delaware 
remains a pro-sandbagging state. Edgarton and Quigley wrote that 
“given the robust body of Chancery Court case law and the 
jurisdiction’s longstanding embrace of freedom of contract between 
sophisticated corporate parties, Delaware courts appear likely to 
continue to affirm a strict pro-sandbagging approach.”58 Although 
many attorneys would rather be safe than sorry, advising buyers to 
put in pro-sandbagging provisions, other dealmakers likely doubt 
that Eagle Force drastically shifted Delaware sandbagging law for 
several reasons. For one, as previously mentioned, the court’s 
comments on sandbagging are dicta, and thus not binding 
authority. Second, buyers can take heart that the majority opinion 
seemed to cite Ziff-Davis favorably, perhaps indicating a future 
adoption of a pro-sandbagging default rule by the Delaware 
Supreme Court. Third, like Edgarton and Quigley stated, Delaware 
is generally committed to freedom-of-contract principles, which 
may influence the court in leaning that direction should it 
encounter a close call. Finally, the reiteration of a pro-sandbagging 
stance by Vice Chancellor Laster in Akorn v. Fresenius shows that at 
least for one prominent member of the Delaware judiciary, 
sandbagging is alive and well. 
With this in mind, Part II looks to the market in order to 
determine the effect of Eagle Force on sandbagging provisions. 
II. AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
A. Overview 
In order to assess the effect of Eagle Force on the market, I took 
an empirical approach.59 My goal was to analyze the following 
across all types of merger agreements: (1) the percentages of deals 
with sandbagging provisions, (2) law firm usage of sandbagging 
 
 57. See id. at 1247 n.39 (Strine, J., concurring). 
 58. Edgarton & Quigley, supra note 2. 
 59. As Professor Whitehead wrote, “[t]he effect of a pro-sandbagging or  
anti-sandbagging rule on sandbagging rights is an empirical question.” Whitehead, supra 
note 5, at 1092. 
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provisions, and (3) how the language of the provisions compared 
to each other. 
This is not the first empirical attempt to determine how often 
silence as well as pro- and anti-sandbagging provisions occur  
in merger and purchase agreements. In 2017, a Deal Points Study  
by the American Bar Association found that “51 percent of 
surveyed acquisition agreements were silent on sandbagging, 
while 42 percent contained pro-sandbagging clauses and 6 percent 
contained anti-sandbagging clauses.”60 Another study conducted 
in 2017 found a predominance of silence in acquisition 
agreements—around 75%—with 25% containing a pro-
sandbagging provision and no surveyed transactions containing 
anti-sandbagging provisions.61 
My research was both narrower and broader than these past 
surveys. Now that a year and a half has passed since Eagle Force, I 
pulled agreements from the months preceding and following the 
disruptive case to see if any changes had occurred. I narrowed my 
search to contracts with Delaware and New York choice of law 
provisions—Delaware because that is the jurisdiction we are 
concerned with, and New York both because of the court’s citation 
to CBS v. Ziff-Davis (and potential adoption of it) and to serve as a 
control to Delaware. My research was also broader than previous 
studies; I looked not only at the frequency of sandbagging 
provisions, but the timing of the agreements, the language used, 
and the law firms drafting the agreements. In analyzing these 
patterns, this study provides a unique addition to the existing 
literature by presenting an empirical test of whether and how Eagle 
Force has affected the broader mergers and acquisitions markets, as 
well as giving insight into how deal lawyers are engineering their 
agreements in response to the case. 
B. Typical Sandbagging Provisions 
Sandbagging provisions are usually contained in the 
indemnification section of a purchase agreement, although they 
may be included as a representation, a covenant, or a provision 
 
 60. Edgarton & Quigley, supra note 2; see also Thomas R. Taylor, “Sandbagging” in 
M&A Transactions, DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR (Jun. 12, 2019), https://www.djplaw.com/ 
news/sandbagging-in-ma-transactions/. 
 61. Taylor, supra note 60. 
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placed separately in the miscellaneous section.62 A common sample 
pro-sandbagging provision from my research reads as follows: 
The representations, warranties and covenants of the 
Indemnifying Party, and the Indemnified Party’s right to 
indemnification with respect thereto, shall not be affected or 
deemed waived by reason of any investigation made by or on 
behalf of the Indemnified Party (including by any of its 
Representatives) or by reason of the fact that the Indemnified 
Party or any of its Representatives knew or should have known 
that any such representation or warranty is, was or might be 
inaccurate or by reason of the Indemnified Party’s waiver of any 
condition set forth in [provisions named]. 
Anti-sandbagging provisions also are almost always found in 
the indemnification section of a purchase agreement. In my 
research, the structure of anti-sandbagging provisions varied much 
more than the pro-sandbagging provisions.63 An anti-sandbagging 
provision might appear similar to the following example, drafted 
by Alston & Bird: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement to the 
contrary, if on or before the Effective Date, the Buyer has 
Knowledge of any fact, event, circumstance or information that 
would cause or establish one or more of the representations and 
warranties made by any Indemnifying Party in this Agreement, 
or in any document delivered in connection with the 
consummation of the transactions contemplated hereby, to be 
inaccurate, erroneous, untrue, incorrect or incomplete, in whole 
or part, as of the date made, then the Buyer (or any Indemnified 
Party claiming through Buyer) shall have no right to assert any 
claim for indemnification hereunder or to seek any remedy after 
the Closing with respect to such inaccuracy, error, falsity, mistake 
or omission or any such breach of representations and warranties 
and shall be deemed to have waived its rights to indemnification 
hereunder for Losses in respect thereof.64  
 
 62. Shadden, supra note 3, at 461. 
 63. See infra Section II.C. 
 64. Alston & Bird, Crown Pine Purchase Agreement by and Among Crown Pine 
Parent, L.P., Crown Pine Reit, Inc., GPT1 LLC, Crown Pine Timber 1, L.P., and Creek Pine 
Holdings, LLC 58 (May 14, 2018) (Bloomberg Law). 
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C. My Study 
My process was as follows: First, using Bloomberg Law’s 
Transactional Precedent tool, I randomly selected 200 purchase 
agreements—100 executed in the months leading up to the Eagle 
Force holding and 100 executed in the months following. Delaware 
was the governing law of choice for half of the agreements, with the 
other half choosing New York law. I took samples of all types of 
purchase agreements, including merger agreements, stock 
purchase agreements, and asset purchase agreements. I then used 
a program called Exploratory to analyze the various agreements.65 
While drawing inferences from 200 samples may not be enough to 
definitively prove these trends, it is likely enough to uncover the 
potential trends and consequences of Eagle Force and illuminate 
areas that deserve further research. 
Table 1 reflects the percentage of agreements containing pro-, 











NY pre-Eagle Force 26% 6% 68% 
DE pre-Eagle Force 16% 6% 78% 
NY post-Eagle Force 30% 8% 62% 
DE post-Eagle Force 10% 0% 90% 
Table 1: Frequency of Pro-, Anti-, and Nonexistent Sandbagging Provisions 
From the data, it seems clear that not including a sandbagging 
provision is the market norm. This is consistent with both Professor 
Whitehead’s 2011 observation of a “recent increase in silence” 
regarding sandbagging provisions, as well as the 2017 study that 
found silence in 75% of surveyed transactions.66 A majority of deals 
might be silent regarding the issue because the market believes that 
Delaware and New York support pro-sandbagging as a default 
 
 65. Exploratory is a user interface for extracting, visualizing, and analyzing data. It is 
accessible at https://exploratory.io/. 
 66. Whitehead, supra note 5, at 1097; Taylor, supra note 60. 
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rule.67 Silence is more common in Delaware than New York 
perhaps because of Delaware’s strong sandbagging reputation and 
deal lawyers’ knowledge of New York’s slightly narrowed pro-
sandbagging stance.68 
Second, again using Bloomberg’s Transactional Precedent tool, 
I conducted an analysis of various firms’ use and nonuse of  
pro- and anti-sandbagging provisions previously gathered. 
Interestingly, although a few firms had a consistent approach—
Kirkland & Ellis and Latham & Watkins were silent on 
sandbagging in every surveyed transaction agreement—many of 
the firms did not. Ellenoff Grossman & Schole had some 
transactions silent on sandbagging and others with express pro-
sandbagging provisions. Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, the M&A 
behemoth, was mostly silent, but one transaction was pulled that 
contained a pro-sandbagging provision. Sidley Austin, Gibson 
Dunn, and Lowenstein Sandler had fairly even numbers of silent 
vs. pro-sandbagging agreements. Davis Polk & Wardwell and 
Cleary Gottlieb were largely silent, but they each had one surveyed 
transaction with an anti-sandbagging provision. In sum, the data 
showed that although a few firms had consistent approaches, most 
of the repeat players in mergers and acquisitions did not. 
Finally, using Exploratory, I analyzed the natural language of 
each sandbagging provision using word vectors.69 Each word is 
assigned a value of 1, and then each word is compared against all 
other words in the provisions in context. Provisions are compared 
on a scale of 0 to 1—1 signifying that the provisions use exactly the 
same verbiage and 0 meaning they share no common words or uses 
at all. A high commonality of words suggests a standardized 
provision, even though standardization of merger agreements is 
surprisingly limited.70 Similar language in a provision may 
highlight a trend whereby law firms incorporate the same 
 
 67. See supra notes 10, 37. 
 68. See supra Section I.C. 
 69. For a layman’s discussion of how word vectors can be used with distributional 
semantics to identify similarities in language, see Allison Parrish, Understanding Word 
Vectors, GITHUB https://github.com/aparrish/rwet/blob/master/understanding-word-
vectors.ipynb (last visited Sept. 30, 2020). 
 70. See Matthew Jennejohn, The Architecture of Contract Innovation, 59 B.C. L. REV. 71, 
85–86 (2018) (“Thus, instead of being highly standardized, merger agreements appear to 
occupy a space somewhere between the two extremes of bespoke and boilerplate 
contracting . . . .”). 
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sandbagging language into their precedent documents, and 
counterparty law firms adopt them into their own agreements as 
they believe the provision is becoming more of a market norm. 
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Figure 1: Natural Language in the Provision 
Figure 2: Scatterplot of Natural Language in the Provision  
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 Across all sandbagging provisions surveyed, whether pro- or 
anti-sandbagging, both the median and the average score on this 
analysis was about 0.65. The language, therefore, was somewhat 
consistent, even across different types of agreements and different 
law firms. Table 2 shows the results divided by governing law and 
their temporal relation to Eagle Force:  
 
New York Pre-Mean 0.754095 
New York Post-Mean 0.729935 
Delaware Pre-Mean 0.655709 
Delaware Post-Mean 0.782977 
Table 2: Natural Language Based on Time of Agreement and Governing Law 
The difference between New York agreements before and after 
Eagle Force is negligible and likely statistically insignificant. Like the 
information from Table 1, there seems to be almost no New York 
market reaction to the Delaware Supreme Court case. However, 
there is a clear increased reaction in the Delaware agreements. This 
difference implies that while fewer Delaware agreements contained 
a sandbagging clause, the language of the provision appears to be 
becoming more standardized. Admittedly, some of the consistency 
in agreements could be based on the fact that the sample size is 
small—only 10% of the agreements I pulled governed by Delaware 
law post-Eagle Force had sandbagging provisions at all to be 
analyzed. Thus, subsequent research is likely needed to confirm 
this pattern. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Why the Silence?  
Perhaps the biggest takeaway from the empirical research is 
that there was no strong market reaction in the Delaware-governed 
agreements after Eagle Force was decided, despite strong 
recommendations by attorneys to include pro-sandbagging 
provisions.71 If Delaware was thought to be a sandbagging state by 
default, and many parties relied on that in not putting express pro-
 
 71. See supra note 26. 
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sandbagging provisions in their agreements, why didn’t those 
numbers increase dramatically? Or at all? I believe that (i) most 
dealmakers believe that Delaware’s pro-sandbagging stance 
remains in force72 and (ii) any uncertainty created by Eagle Force is 
outweighed by increased seller leverage in the marketplace as high 
acquisition activity continued in the months following the decision. 
Professor Whitehead believed an increase in pro-sandbagging 
provisions signified an increase in buyer leverage in the 
negotiations, whereas an increase in silence conversely signaled an 
increase in seller leverage.73 The Institute for Mergers, Acquisitions 
& Alliances (IMAA) noted an increase in mergers and acquisitions 
activity in 2018, the year Eagle Force was decided.74 Although it 
predicted a very slight decrease in 2019, merger activity still 
remained relatively high, as seen in Figure 3: 
Figure 3: Mergers & Acquisitions in the United States by Year75 
 
 
 72. Reasons to believe in Delaware continuing a default sandbagging regime  
include the majority’s citation of CBS v. Ziff-Davis, Delaware Chancery pro-sandbagging 
cases, comparative New York sandbagging law, Delaware’s general commitment to 
freedom-of-contract principles, Vice Chancellor Laster’s recent rejection of reliance as a 
requirement to bring a breach of warranty claim in Akorn v. Fresenius, and the fact that the 
comments in Eagle Force are dicta. These arguments are identified supra Part I. 
 73. Whitehead, supra note 5, at 1098. 
 74. M&A in the United States, INST. FOR MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS & ALLS. (2019), 
https://imaa-institute.org/m-and-a-us-united-states/. 
 75. Id. 
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Cravath, Swaine & Moore’s last quarterly mergers and 
acquisitions report for 2019 summarized global deal value and deal 
count from 2014 to 2019. It showed similar results: 
 
Figure 4: Global M&A Activity from 2014 to 201976 
Similar to the data on U.S. merger activity, Cravath reported 
that although both 2019 deal values and volume declined slightly, 
it was still by all counts “a robust year for global M&A activity,” as 
it marked the “sixth successive year that global deal values 
exceeded $3 trillion.”77 And 2018, the year Eagle Force was decided, 
had even higher numbers.78 Moreover, Cravath reported that “the 
United States continued to capture an outsized share of the global 
M&A market, posting its second best year in terms of deal value 
since 2009.”79 Put simply, the latter part of 2018 and the beginning 
of 2019—the period from which the post-Eagle Force transactions 
were pulled—was a hot market for M&A activity, particularly in 
the United States. 
Additionally, not only was M&A activity robust, but corporate 
executives believed that the trend would continue. In Deloitte 
Touche Tohmatsu Limited’s 2019 M&A Trends Survey report, the 
 
 76. Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, M&A, Activism and Corporate Governance,  
CRAVATH Q. REV., Quarter 4 2019, at 1, https://www.cravath.com/a/web/11874/ 
Cravath%20Quarterly%20Review%20-%20M&A,%20Activism%20and%20Corporate%20G
overnanc.pdf. 
 77. Id. The year 2019 had “the third highest level of M&A activity in terms of deal 
value since 2009.” Id. 
 78. Id.; see also supra Figure 4. 
 79. Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, supra note 76. 
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firm asked 1,000 executives and private equity firms for their 
insight, opinions, and expectations on deal activity for the next 
twelve months—from Fall 2018 to Fall 2019.80 Their report showed 
that 76% of executives and 87% of leaders at private equity firms 
expected the number of deals done by their organizations to 
increase.81 Moreover, not only did they expect the number of deals 
to increase, but they also anticipated that the size of such deals 
would increase.82 Thus, not only was M&A activity very high, but 
a large majority of executives leading the big players in  
the acquisition market believed in late 2018—the months after  
Eagle Force—that such activity would continue to grow.  
This data supports Whitehead’s hypothesis; as merger activity 
remains strong and parties believe that this activity will continue, 
sellers have more potential buyers and thus greater leverage in 
negotiating purchase agreements. Buyers, in order to remain 
competitive in the bidding process, could be less forceful about 
negotiating pro-sandbagging provisions and instead are 
comfortable with relying (or are forced to rely) on the state’s default 
rules. Increased seller leverage could thus explain the increase in 
silence as buyers are simply willing to let default rules govern as 
part of the acquisition process.  
Silence could also be an indicator that a buyer and seller were 
unable to agree on a provision83 or simply believed it would not be 
worth the increased transaction cost. There is a tension between the 
need for “sufficient certainty to support investment, on one hand, 
and the ability to adapt to changing, unforeseeable circumstances, 
on the other.”84 Potential negotiations of a sandbagging clause may 
be very time consuming and intensive, and parties may adopt the 
pragmatic solution of not bearing this cost ex ante and instead take 
their chances of litigation.85 
Furthermore, Whitehead, and later Jastrzębski, argue that 
under a pro-sandbagging regime, sellers and buyers have limited 
 
 80. RUSSELL THOMSON, SUSAN DETTMAR & MARK GARAY, DELOITTE, THE STATE OF THE 
DEAL: M&A TRENDS 2019, at 1 (2018), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/ 
us/Documents/mergers-acqisitions/us-mergers-acquisitions-trends-2019-report.pdf. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See Taylor, supra note 60. 
 84. See Jennejohn, supra note 70, at 87. 
 85. See Jastrzębski, supra note 2, at 236. 
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incentives to contract around the default rule.86 Sellers want to 
demonstrate to buyers that they are credible and that the buyers 
can rely on their representations and warranties.87 Pushing hard for 
an anti-sandbagging clause would likely undermine that 
credibility. Buyers working within a pro-sandbagging rule have 
little incentive to argue for an explicit provision when the default 
goes in their favor. Why pay higher negotiating and transaction 
costs when silence gets you the same result?88 The compromise is 
therefore often silence.  
However, the incentives argument carries less weight 
considering the doubt of a Delaware pro-sandbagging regime 
created by Eagle Force. Buyers who strongly desire sandbagging 
rights would be willing to pay a little more in transaction costs in 
order to confirm those rights and avoid the uncertainty that comes 
with relying on a default rule. Thus, my argument is that (i) most 
dealmakers believe that Delaware’s pro-sandbagging stance 
remains in force89 and (ii) any uncertainty created by Eagle Force is 
outweighed by increased seller leverage in the marketplace as high 
acquisition activity continued in the months following the decision. 
Buyers, wanting to remain competitive throughout the auction 
process, appear confident enough to be willing to potentially test 
sandbagging in Delaware courts. 
B. Law Firm Data & Provision Language 
As mentioned previously,90 although some law firms had a 
consistent approach to whether they included a sandbagging 
provision, most law firms who were repeat players varied to some 
degree. The variance could be explained simply by recognizing that 
different contracting parties cared more or less about sandbagging 
rights, and law firms were tailoring the agreements to the needs 
and preferences of the parties. It also suggests that despite evidence 
of the language in sandbagging provisions in Delaware agreements 
becoming more standardized,91 the same standardization 
 
 86. Whitehead, supra note 5, at 1081, 1088; Jastrzębski, supra note 2, at 236–37. 
 87. See Whitehead, supra note 5, at 1088. 
 88. See id. at 1102. 
 89. See supra note 72. 
 90. See supra Part II. 
 91. See supra notes 70–74 and accompanying text. 
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regarding sandbagging provisions does not necessarily exist within 
most firms. The fact that most of the law firms varied to some 
degree also implies that although some firms may have a default—
which is likely no sandbagging provision—sandbagging 
provisions are still very much customizable.92 The inclusion of a 
provision is likely still the result of a bargained-for-agreement, as 
law firms address the risks their clients care about and structure 
their deals accordingly.   
The lack of systematic change could also be a signal that 
although some attorneys viewed Eagle Force as a legitimate threat 
to Delaware’s pro-sandbagging default,93 law firms as a whole did 
not. Some sophisticated counsel—Kirkland & Ellis and Latham & 
Watkins—were silent on sandbagging in every agreement I 
examined that they worked as counsel, potentially meaning that 
they were not too preoccupied with the threat of change by Eagle 
Force. Alternatively, perhaps even if the attorneys thought it wise 
to include an explicit pro-sandbagging provision, the negotiating 
leverage of sellers in the market outweighed those concerns, and 
the buyers, with the advice of counsel, thought silence would 
simply have to do.  
Similar arguments can be made about the language of the 
sandbagging provisions. There was no material change in how 
similar or dissimilar the provisions were in the New York 
agreements. However, the increased similarity of provisions in 
Delaware could mean that because of doubt created by Eagle Force, 
some law firms took language from other law firms in an attempt 
to improve their provision for clarity, strength, etc. Thus, 
uncertainty as to Delaware’s stance on sandbagging could cause 
firms to adopt a pro-sandbagging provision, and others, seeing 
their sophisticated counterparty include that provision, to decide to 
adopt that provision wholesale into their next agreement when a 
sandbagging provision is needed. Here, standardization of 
sandbagging provisions means that although the inclusion of a 
sandbagging provision is still very negotiable, the language of the 
term may be becoming more boilerplate.  
 
 92. See Jennejohn, supra note 70, at Part I for a discussion on the mass customization 
of merger agreements. 
 93. See supra note 26. 
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This trend, if confirmed by further research, is significant, as 
merger agreements are not fully standardized, despite their 
complexity.94 Standardization across a market allows deal 
attorneys to achieve economies of scale, thereby reducing 
transaction and negotiating costs for parties.95 There are other 
benefits to standard language in contracts: provisions become 
boilerplate as market participants and their counsel determine that 
the language is useful and serves their ends.96 Courts can thus feel 
confident enforcing such provisions, and parties can more 
predictably determine how courts will interpret them.97 A 
standardized sandbagging provision could also serve as a 
“signaling mechanism,” where law firms signal their sophistication 
by proposing standardized or “market” terms.98 All of these 
benefits attach to the potential standardization of a Delaware 
sandbagging provision.  
However, the idea that parties would simply accept boilerplate 
sandbagging language undermines the assumption that 
agreements accurately reflect the preferences of the parties. Law 
firm intermediaries may simply agree, or convince their clients to 
agree, to what they perceive to be “market” terms.99 It could then 
be argued that sandbagging provisions, when included, may not 
necessarily reflect the parties’ true intentions in their bargained-for-
agreement—a principle that courts have explicitly relied on in 
deciding sandbagging cases.100 For example, the Ziff-Davis court 
said that in enforcing sandbagging, the critical question was 
whether the buyer believed it was purchasing the seller’s promise 
 
 94. See Jennejohn, supra note 70, at 75. 
 95. See id. at 89 (“[S]cale economies can play a role in contract design, as in many  
other markets. Market complexity can lead parties to standardize contract terms . . . .”).  
But see Professor Jennejohn’s article generally for an explanation of how deal engineers 
achieve economies of scale and scope, or “mass customization,” through what he terms  
“flexible specialization.” Id. 
 96. See, e.g., Steven W. Feldman, Actual Agreement, Shared Meaning Analysis, and the 
Invalidation of Boilerplate: A Response to Professors Kar and Radin, 84 MO. L. REV. 711, 729 (2019). 
 97. See id.; Jennejohn, supra note 70, at 90 (“Widely adopted standardized terms allow 
parties to reduce both front-end negotiating costs—both parties to the deal understand the 
common language, which can streamline costly dickering—and back-end enforcement 
costs—if a court has given a standard term a definitive interpretation, then enforcement 
uncertainty can be reduced.”). 
 98. See Jennejohn, supra note 70, at 90. 
 99. Id. at 90–91. 
 100. See, e.g., supra notes 26–34 and accompanying text. 
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of truth.101 If the provision was included because it was “market” 
and not because the buyer thought it was purchasing the 
representation as part of the agreement, then a primary justification 
for a pro-sandbagging regime is lost. However, this concern can be 
eliminated by the fact that parties likely would have not included a 
sandbagging provision at all had they not cared; in fact, because the 
data shows that silence is the market norm,102 parties likely only 
include a sandbagging provision when it is the clear intention of 
the parties. Pro-sandbagging provisions in today’s market likely 
only occur when the buyer specifically requests it and has  
the bargaining power to obtain it. Thus, the inclusion of any  
pro-sandbagging provision means that the buyer thought it was 
purchasing the seller’s truth, and the concern is unfounded.  
In short, Eagle Force’s longest-lasting impact may not be that 
parties more often use express pro-sandbagging provisions in their 
agreements, but that when used, pro-sandbagging provisions are 
more standardized across the market. As disclosed previously, 
subsequent research should confirm this trend, as this data could 
potentially be insignificant because of the small sample size. 
Despite my research’s shortcomings, however, the data highlights 
potential trends that shed light on both how practitioners perceive 
Delaware’s and New York’s default sandbagging rules, as well as 
how they deal with that perception in the agreements themselves. 
CONCLUSION 
Eagle Force Holdings, LLC v. Campbell likely does not signal a 
change in Delaware sandbagging law, despite the strong reaction 
from law firms and practitioners. I believe that should the Delaware 
Supreme Court take up the issue, the court will follow the New 
York Court of Appeals decision in CBS v. Ziff-Davis and explicitly 
adopt a pro-sandbagging regime, consistent with its contractarian 
reputation and Court of Chancery caselaw. The fact that Eagle Force 
did not deter Vice Chancellor Laster in Akorn v. Fresenius lends 
support for my prediction. The collected data shows that law firms 
drafting and negotiating Delaware and New York agreements are 
largely leaving them silent as to sandbagging provisions, 
entrusting parties to the states’ default rules. Delaware contracts in 
 
 101. See supra note 35. 
 102. See supra Table 1. 
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particular actually became increasingly silent following Eagle Force. 
This data likely signals that most dealmakers trust Delaware’s pro-
sandbagging reputation despite Eagle Force, or alternatively, that 
any doubts created thereby are outweighed by sellers’ negotiating 
leverage in a strong acquisition market and the desire to avoid 
increased transaction costs associated with drafting and 
negotiating sandbagging provisions. Similar language in Delaware 
agreements post-Eagle Force may suggest a trend whereby 
sandbagging provisions are becoming standardized in the mergers 
and acquisitions market due to the uncertainty created by the case. 
Thus, while Eagle Force surprisingly did not trigger an increase in 
pro-sandbagging provisions in Delaware agreements, it appears to 
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